



**Ministry of Cabinet Affairs  
Office of the Minister**

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**Response of the Transitional Government of National  
Unity (TGoNU) Council of Ministers to the IGAD  
Communiqué of IGAD Council of Ministers on  
July 13, 2016**

1. The Council of Ministers of the Transitional Government of National Unity (TGoNU) held an Extra-Ordinary meeting No. 02/2016 on the 12<sup>th</sup> July 2016 and listened *inter aliato* a briefing from the Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation on the Communiqué of IGAD Council of Ministers during its 56<sup>th</sup> Extraordinary Session on South Sudan held on the 11<sup>th</sup> July, 2016 in Nairobi, Kenya. The Council resolved to respond to the IGAD Communiqué.
2. The Council further acknowledges the IGAD communiqué and expresses its sincere gratitude for its continuous concern on the political and security situation in the Republic of South Sudan. Furthermore, it expresses its unreserved commitment to cooperate with the leadership of IGAD to stabilize the situation in the context of the Arrangement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan (ARCSS).
3. The fighting begun on the 7<sup>th</sup> July 2016, at the Lou Clinic security checkpoint. On the 8<sup>th</sup> July 2016 it was fully erupted in the Presidential Palace, followed by the 10<sup>th</sup> July 2016, fighting where the SPLA-IO attacked a government force checkpoint and overran it. On the 11<sup>th</sup> July 2016, government forces moved to recapture that post from the SPLA-IO.



The same Lieutenant Colonel who shot security soldiers at the Lou Check point is the same officer who provoked the fight again in the Presidential Palace. Appendix-1 provides a brief description of the events for fair judgment of the parties to the conflict.

4. Having highlighted the events related to the fight in Juba, in point 3 above, the TGoNU Council of Ministers:

- (i) Believes that the IGAD Council of Ministers must now have a concrete appreciation of what actually happened.
- (ii) Maintains that the TGoNU forces did not target any UN Compound, nor did they attempt to prevent civilians from getting protection. To the contrary UN forces targeted SPLA soldiers advancing to the recapture its post from the SPLA-IO and destroyed two T-72 tanks and killed several SPLA soldiers.
- (iii) The President showed undoubted control over the Presidential Guards and demonstrated responsibility for the safety of his colleagues, the First Vice President (FVP), the Vice President (VP) and other Ministers, otherwise South Sudan would have been plunged into severe insecurity and a high potential for total return to war.

In addition to the point made above (4-iii), the President exercises full command and control over the SPLA Forces as affirmed by the truce so far observed in Juba in response to Presidential Order (No. 17/2016 issued 11<sup>th</sup> July 2016).

Juba is now calm, civilians are returning home, the army are withdrawing to their respective barracks, security checkpoints have been reduced to only essential areas and messages of calm and reconciliation are being issued to the public from the Office of the President and through the Council of Ministers.

5. With regards to the demands outlined in the IGAD Council of Ministers Communiqué, the TGoNU Council of Ministers makes the following response:

- (i) **On the Ceasefire (a):** The Council confirms that H.E. The President issued an Order as referred to earlier (No. 17/2016) issued 11<sup>th</sup> July 2016), declaring cessation of Hostilities between the SPLA and the SPLA-IO effective instantly from 6.00pm with unequivocal orders to all SPLA Commanders.



H.E. The President sent additional message to all Commanders reiterating the return of all SPLA Soldiers to their respective barracks, and calling on the forces to protect civilians and their property, protect any ethnic groups as well as any SPLA-IO who surrenders to the SPLA and limit security checkpoints to only essential and important government installations and institutions.

- (ii) **On Juba International Airport (b):** The TGoNU Council of Ministers affirms that Juba International Airport was never closed to be re-opened. It admits the Airport witnessed a temporary interruption for outgoing and incoming flights. However, since the issuance of the presidential order for cessation of hostilities, Juba International Airport commenced operations effectively from the 12<sup>th</sup> July 2016 and continues to operate peacefully and unabated.

The normal functioning of the Airport has not been compromised. Hence the concern expressed in the IGAD Communiqué regarding protection of the Airport is not justified.

- (iii) **On the Immediate Return on all Forces and Weapons to barracks (c):** The Council confirms with delight that this concern has been addressed as explained in 5(i) above.

- (iv) **On opening humanitarian corridors (d):** Open delivery of humanitarian assistance and secure delivery corridors have always been a high priority policy of the government since the eruption of the conflict on the 15<sup>th</sup> December 2013.

It remains a cornerstone policy of the TGoNU, which has been reinforced by Presidential Orders to all the Governors of the States of South Sudan and SPLA Commanders to remove illegal roadblocks and allow unhindered delivery of humanitarian assistance to those in need all over the Country.

The Ministry of Humanitarian Affairs and Disaster Management, in collaboration with the Relief and Rehabilitation Commission (RRC), has developed a plan of action to implementation of Chapter-III on the ARCSS on Humanitarian Assistance and Reconstruction. This plan is now the subject of discussion between the Ministry, the RRC, United Nations humanitarian agencies and others to agree on the articulated strategic direction and plan of action on the subject.



- (v) **On the Revision of UNMISS Mandate (e):**The Council recalls that the Mandate of UNMISS was reviewed in November, 2015, and that UNMISS currently has a force of over twelve thousands troops.

As outlined earlier, fighting has come to an end and the security situation is returning to normalcy. Therefore, the Council sees no justification and strongly believes that the establishment of an Intervention Brigade is totally unwarranted and will actually complicate the situation and increase insecurity.

As for the demand of the IGAD Council of Ministers to increase troops to *inter alia* secure Juba, this is provided for in Chapter-II, Article 5 of the ARCSS. With the current improvement in the Security situation in Juba the Council again sees no reason for this demand.

- (vi) **On Accountability of those responsible for the breakdown of law and order (f):**The President of the Republic issued a Republican Order (No. 16/2016, effective 8<sup>th</sup> July, 2016) for the formation of an Investigation Committee to investigate the incidents, which started with the fight on the 7<sup>th</sup>July 2016.

The Minister of Interior is the Chairperson assisted by the Minister of National Security as Secretary and with the membership of five (5) senior officers from both sides. The same committee will equally investigate the incident of the 8<sup>th</sup> July 2016. The committee is given the option to co-opt any relevant member or members. TGoNU awaits for the report of the Committee and its recommendations.

- (vii) **On the implementation of the security arrangements as enshrined in the ARCSS (g):**The Council had hoped that H.E. President Festus Mogae, Chairperson of the Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission (JMEC) briefed the IGAD Council of Ministers on the progress already made on the implementation of the Security Arrangements.

However, the Council confirms that since the commencement of the implementation of the Agreement many parts of Chapter-II on the Permanent Ceasefire and Transitional Security Arrangements, have been undertaken. These include the formation of: (i) The Joint Military Ceasefire Commission (JMCC), (ii) The Ceasefire and Transitional Security Arrangement Monitoring Mechanism




(CTSAMM), (iii) the Strategic Defense and Security Review (SDSR) Board, and (iv) The Joint Integrated Police (JIP).

In addition the Council made several resolutions on the release of Prisoners of War and Detainees, Cantonment Areas in Greater Upper Nile and the Greater Equatoria, the verification of Cantonment areas in Greater Bahr-el-Ghazal and directives given to the JMCC and CTSAMM to immediately implement those Resolutions.

**5. In conclusion**

- (i) The TGoNU Council of Ministers reiterates its appreciation of the concerns raised by the IGAD Council of Ministers and underlines its commitment to cooperate with IGAD and the entire International Community to ensure security in Juba specifically and South Sudan in general.
- (ii) The Council regrets the unfortunate fighting that erupted on the 7<sup>th</sup> July, 2016, after nearly three months of the establishment of the Transitional Government of National Unity and assures IGAD the Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan is the only valuable instrument for peace in South Sudan and call on IGAD to continue providing support.

Signed:

  
**Dr. Martin Elia Lomuro**  
**Minister of Cabinet Affairs**

18/7  
2016.



## Appendix-1

### Statement of facts on the fighting, which erupted in the Republic of South Sudan on the 7<sup>th</sup>, 8<sup>th</sup>, 10<sup>th</sup> and the 11<sup>th</sup> of July 2016 respectively.

6. The TGoNU Council of Ministers wishes to make a brief statement of facts regarding the unfortunate fighting that erupted on the 7<sup>th</sup> July and continued till the 11<sup>th</sup> of July, 2016, as follows:
  - (i) On Thursday the 7<sup>th</sup> July, 2016, at approximately 7.45 pm Lieutenant Colonel David Rieu from the SPLA/IO shot dead five (5) people (Two National Security, 2 Military Intelligence and a passing by Medical Doctor) conducting routine security checks at a Checkpoint near Lou Clinic a distance from the center of Juba Town, in preparation for the 5<sup>th</sup> Independence Celebration day
  - (ii) The following day on Friday the 8<sup>th</sup> July 2016, H.E. The President called on the FVP and the VP for a meeting in the Presidential Palace (J-1) to discuss how to de-escalate the situation.
  - (iii) On the 8<sup>th</sup> July 2016, it was observed that the FVP came to the meeting with a convoy of twenty (20) Land Cruiser Picks estimated to carrying over three hundred well-armed soldiers. The meeting, nevertheless, commenced and continued undisturbed to the point where the three leaders made credible resolution on the way forward, except for a few minor points that were to be ironed out the at 11.00am on Saturday the 9<sup>th</sup> July, 2016.
  - (iv) Before the three leaders could conclude their meeting in the President's meeting Hall, gunshots rained unabated at the Southern Gate to J-1. Despite all that happened, the President issued a Republic Order No. 17/2016 for immediate cessation of hostilities with immediate effect from the date of the signature as from 1800 hours GMT (6 pm) yesterday the 11<sup>th</sup> July 2016.
  - (v) The three leaders were taken by surprise and caught unaware as to the cause of the shooting that was taking place inside, outside and around the Palace. Indeed, they were paralyzed and unable to control the situation until the Minister of National Security intervened.



- (vi) As the Presidential Guards gradually contained the assault, it finally transpired that the Lieutenant Colonel David Rieu of the SPLA-IO, who shot dead the five people on Thursday 7<sup>th</sup> July 2016, had imposed himself to enter the Palace and on resistance by the Presidential Guards shot dead 1<sup>st</sup> Lt. Kouch Kouch and that ignited the fighting.
- (vii) As the President took control of the situation, the FVP revealed that the Lt. Colonel who ignited the fight was not amongst the officers who were to accompany him for the meeting.
- (viii) From there on, the President throughout the hours of fighting:
- a) Personally protected the FVP and the VP in his office', and the three
  - b) Called on his personal armored vehicle to be brought from his residence, covered the FVP from reach by his own guards,
  - c) Opened for him the door and got him seated in the vehicle and then instructed the driver to take him safely up to Checkpoint at Lou Clinic so that he walks to his residence under the protection of his own guards.
  - d) Before he was driven away, the President requested that he should call him to confirm that he had arrived safely. Indeed the FVP call on arrival to his residence and thanked H.E. The President for the leadership he had shown to personally protect him during the unfortunate incident'.
7. Prior to the evacuation of the FVP, the three leaders had agreed to meet on Saturday the 11<sup>th</sup> July, 2016, at 11.0am to further discuss the aggravated situation but since then the FVP is yet to confirm his intention to come for the meeting although he has made contact with H.E. The President.
8. As we write this response, His Excellency the President is patiently awaiting contact from his FVP in order to continue working with him and the others leaders of South Sudan to de-escalate the situation and focus in the implementation of the Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan because it is the only sensible mechanism to return the Country to political and security stability.

